Его величество - ФУТБОЛ

[Lirium]

Ибо до этого момента не было такого в истории Челс, чтобы уходил ведущий игрок в самом игровом возрасте.

Мата, Матич, Коста. Пусть в первых двух случаях реально ведущими игроками они по разным причинам уже не являлись, а в последнем всё упиралось в неисправимое желание уйти.

В итоге Коста ушел не совсем сам, больше его ушли... будь кто другой тренер, могло сложиться иначе, но тут да - 50 на 50, и больше под ответственность тренера, так что клуб всё же не особо принимал участие. А по первым двум ты и сам всё ответил... оба уже не были ведущими. Так что случай с Азаром такое себе.

[OneOfTheBestYet]

В итоге Коста ушел не совсем сам, больше его ушли... будь кто другой тренер, могло сложиться иначе, но тут да - 50 на 50, и больше под ответственность тренера, так что клуб всё же не особо принимал участие. А по первым двум ты и сам всё ответил... оба уже не были ведущими. Так что случай с Азаром такое себе.

Ну Коста рвался уйти на протяжении двух лет, так что тут сожалеть не о чем. Конте просто так не стал бы убирать из команды человека, который в состоянии дать тебе 20+ мячей за сезон.
А вот Мата... Тот, молодой Мата был просто великолепен. В скаме тень, конечно. Так, изредка выстрелит. Но это вообще странный клуб с очень странной трансферной политикой ещё до Моуринью.

[Shaft]

Ибо до этого момента не было такого в истории Челс, чтобы уходил ведущий игрок в самом игровом возрасте.

Мата, Матич, Коста. Пусть в первых двух случаях реально ведущими игроками они по разным причинам уже не являлись, а в последнем всё упиралось в неисправимое желание уйти.

Я очень тебя уважаю. Блю


Люблю переписываться с тобой и всегда уважаю твоё мнение. Но нет!

[Lirium]

OneOfTheBestYet,
ситуация с Костой не то чтобы нестандартная, но если отталкиваться от моего первоначального посыла "не было такого в истории Челс, чтобы уходил ведущий игрок в самом игровом возрасте", то получается так, имхо:

Несмотря на то, что Диего каждый раз порывался уйти, но в итоге ушёл он по решению тренера. Можно сказать, что Конте вычеркнул Диего из списка "ведущих игроков". Да, может Диего и сам бы свалил, но в тех обстоятельствах получилось, что и тренер не рассчитывал на него вообще. Вот если бы Конте хотел его оставить, и всё лето мы бы читали, как клуб пытается сохранить Диего, но тот в итоге сваливает - тогда да. А так клуб в итоге и не столкнулся с проблемой именно удержания, т.к. игрок не был нужен тренеру. Как-то так, именно с этой точки зрения.

А с Хуаном да, горе было жуткое и непонимание, как можно выкинуть того, кто стал олицетворением нового Челс >_< Но опять же непонимание с моей стороны, а по итогу он уже не входил в планы коуча и опять же у рук-ва не было головной боли с уговорами игрока остаться, но тот всё равно решил бы уйти. А вот в случае с Азаром может случиться, что поднятия ЗП будет совсем недостаточно...

[OneOfTheBestYet]

OneOfTheBestYet,
ситуация с Костой не то чтобы нестандартная, но если отталкиваться от моего первоначального посыла "не было такого в истории Челс, чтобы уходил ведущий игрок в самом игровом возрасте", то получается так, имхо:

Несмотря на то, что Диего каждый раз порывался уйти, но в итоге ушёл он по решению тренера. Можно сказать, что Конте вычеркнул Диего из списка "ведущих игроков". Да, может Диего и сам бы свалил, но в тех обстоятельствах получилось, что и тренер не рассчитывал на него вообще. Вот если бы Конте хотел его оставить, и всё лето мы бы читали, как клуб пытается сохранить Диего, но тот в итоге сваливает - тогда да. А так клуб в итоге и не столкнулся с проблемой именно удержания, т.к. игрок не был нужен тренеру. Как-то так, именно с этой точки зрения.

Коста совершенно точно был нужен Конте как игрок, но не нужен с личностной точки зрения. Т.к. второе очень часто оказывает негативное влияние на его игру, а Конте нужны только профессионалы. Он не стал сидеть на пороховой бочке и ждать, когда бразилец в следующий раз захочет в "Атлетико", Китай или решит выбить контракт пожирнее.

[OneOfTheBestYet]

Я очень тебя уважаю. Блю


Люблю переписываться с тобой и всегда уважаю твоё мнение. Но нет!

Что именно "нет", друг?

[Lirium]

OneOfTheBestYet,

Ок, ситуацию с Костой можно вынести за скобки, поскольку тренер сделал ход на опережение, поэтому клуб решал несколько иную задачу с Диего. Я скорее о ситуациях, как было например с уходом Сэска из Арса в Барсу.

[true_blood]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/SiPhillipsCFC/statu ... 6851884032[/tweet]

[Lirium]

Благие намерения...

[airstudio54]

«У меня есть принципы, которых я держался всю карьеру. Например, высокий прессинг. Но в Англии он буквально запрещен. Просто-напросто запрещен. Так как мяч находится в воздухе чаще, чем на земле. Мне нужно адаптироваться», – возмущался Пеп в конце прошлого сезона.

Конечно это не для публикации в разделе "Лаборатория футбола", но все же интересно.

[Takteeq]

А ещё интересно то, что сити, нельзя сказать, что обладает каким то нереальным составом с другой планеты.
Манчини, Пеллегрини обладали таким же ресурсом.
Просто чтобы брать АПЛ, нужно её шокировать, нужно гнуть свою линию, и делать то, что делаешь лучше всего, конечно если твои идеи и методы свежы. Или если вообще они никем другим неповторимы. Пример Моу первого прихода, пример Конте, который ворвался и порвал всех с 3-4-3..а сейчас все это прокушали, и много кто юзает, тот же Пеп иной раз. Поэтому тренеров и меняют, когда их идея перестаёт жить, пропадает и результат

[airstudio54]

Редко когда твоя специальность позволяет стоять на месте. Особенно в командном деле.

[unreal]

FFP 2.0 первые наброски.(“слили” чтобы узнать реакцию)
Основное предложение - разница от покупок и продаж игроков в одном сезон не должна превышать лимит в -€100m. Другой вариант - ограничение в 25 профессиональных игроков на одну команду(конец арендых ферм).
24 Мая будет голосование.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/le_Parisien_PSG/sta ... 8728801281[/tweet]

[airstudio54]

«Мы начинаем прессинг, когда мяч доходит до определенного игрока или следует пас в недодачу. В этот момент ты включаешься и начинаешь прессинговать вместе с командой. У нас заготовлено около сотни триггеров на этот случай. В моем предыдущем клубе ничего такого не было»

[unreal]

No Hunger in Paradise - Documentary, 2018 (BT Sport Film)

This BT Sport Film offers an extraordinary insight into the trials and tribulations that lurk beneath the football dream, featuring interviews with some of the game's best coaches.

The film is based on the book by award-winning author, broadcaster and journalist Michael Calvin, and features the likes of Arsene Wenger, Gareth Southgate and Steven Gerrard.

With only half of one per cent of boys who enter academies at the age of nine going on to make a living from the game, the film addresses why so many fail to make an impact at the country’s top clubs. No Hunger in Paradise looks at those players who have found success, and shares the stories of those who haven’t been as lucky.

Длина 01:14:42
https://weshare.me/1a6813234c060118/No. ... e.DOCU.mp4

[andrew]

https://www.sports.ru/tribuna/blogs/eng ... 60486.html
статья о том как лидс пытался поменять свой логотип)

[unreal]

Football’s finishing school: the Borussia Dortmund prodigy production line
The German club’s system is the envy of the world’s wealthiest teams – but is it a victim of its own success?

Murad Ahmed
JANUARY 19, 2018

December 2014, Anatolia, Turkey. Scouts from the German football club Borussia Dortmund are attending a youth tournament involving the USA’s highly rated under-17s team. Talent spotters have orders from Michael Zorc, a former Dortmund captain who is now the club’s sporting director, to watch a teenage American forward called Haji Wright.

According to Zorc, an excited scout calls him to say: “This guy is good but in the same team there is another guy who is extremely good, and we have to go after him.” The other guy is a 15-year-old called Christian Pulisic. Short and slight, he has impressed with his ability to dribble the ball quickly, using either foot. Other boys find his movements hard to predict and even harder to stop.

The scout is right. At 17, Pulisic becomes the youngest foreign player to score in the Bundesliga, Germany’s top division, and the youngest to score for the full US national team. Still only 19, he is a first-team regular at Dortmund, where he continues to slalom around defenders, though his opponents are now grown men. “We love to identify players who can make the difference in the game, and Christian, of course, is one of those,” Zorc tells me.

In today’s big money football world, all elite professional clubs have youth academies, dedicated to training boys (and, at some clubs, girls) for the future and to discovering the game’s next big thing. But over the past decade, Dortmund have become synonymous with recruiting and unleashing the game’s most exciting — and expensive — talent.


Christian Pulisic who, at 17, became the youngest foreign player to score in the Bundesliga © Jasper Bastian

ПоказатьСвернуть

At many clubs, Pulisic would be considered a once-in-a-generation prodigy but the German club have created something more valuable: a production line of once-in-a-generation prodigies, from Mario Götze, the wunderkind whose dramatic late goal for Germany won the 2014 World Cup final, to the fledgling France striker Ousmane Dembélé, who was bought by Barcelona last summer for €105m — an astonishing figure for a player who had started a mere 22 games for Dortmund.

With football’s January transfer window — a period in which teams can acquire players — in full swing, the continent’s best teams are sure to be circling around the German club’s best youngsters once more, desperate to grab the fruits of football’s ultimate finishing school. Those rivals may be better off asking themselves a key question: just how do Borussia Dortmund do it?


Night view of the Signal Iduna Park stadium, Dortmund’s home ground © Jasper Bastian

Residents of Dortmund, a blue-collar city in Germany’s Ruhr valley, say they feel civic pride about two things: erecting the world’s largest Christmas tree every year, and their vibrant football team. The feeling is summed up by the club’s slogan Echte Liebe, which means “true love”. It is a devotion shared by fans and club alike. The price of match-day tickets — and beer — at the team’s home ground Signal Iduna Park, known to fans as the Westfalenstadion, is kept low. The cheapest ticket is €16.70, the most expensive €54.40, a fraction of the cost at clubs such as Manchester United and Barcelona. Dortmund says they could charge more but that their duty to the city takes priority over making money. 

In return, more than 80,000 fans regularly pack the ground, creating a memorably raucous atmosphere. After one recent match, the Real Madrid midfielder Toni Kroos told a Dortmund staffer that he was unable to keep his footing at corner kicks as the “yellow wall” of fans in the southern stand kept bouncing up and down, making the earth tremble. 

It’s a philosophy that shapes Dortmund’s approach from top to bottom. All 200 players at the club, starting with boys aged eight, practise at the training ground in the quiet suburb of Brackel, where low-rise buildings are set alongside 18,000 square metres of manicured football pitches. The set-up is designed for the young players to see the first team up close, allowing them literally to view their path to the top. But the facilities are also deliberately sparse and unfussy — youngsters and veterans are encouraged to mingle on a level playing field. 

The aim is to create a close-knit community, one that matches the club’s bond with the city it serves. The very best teenagers are invited to stay at Dortmund’s boarding school, with 22 boys aged between 15 and 19 housed in rooms at the training ground. The process can be brutal, too: the vast majority of apprentices will be cut from the club’s ranks over time, judged not good enough to play for the first team. Still, the club is proud that more than 50 players from their academy are currently playing professional football.


A session at the training centre in Brackel © Jasper Bastian

Out on the training ground, I am greeted by a man who wears a grey puffer jacket displaying the Dortmund crest but speaks with an English accent. Tim Kirk, 40, was hired by Dortmund earlier this year to coach their under-12s. A budding footballer as a child, Kirk’s own dream of turning professional ended following a serious knee injury aged 18. Instead, he went on to found a free coaching programme for local schoolchildren in Bath that produced 80 kids who moved on to the academies at professional clubs. It was a track record that brought him to Dortmund’s attention. 

We try to find these extraordinary players when they are not at their peak. We develop them and then, at some time, we know that they will go
Michael Zorc, sporting director

Kirk tells me that at Dortmund his 12-year-old charges are not assessed on winning matches — that demand will come later in life — but on whether they reach a specific target. In a game, a striker may be told they will be judged not only on whether they score goals, likely to be one of their strengths, but also on how well they “press” or chase down a defender, potentially a weakness.

“It’s challenging them intellectually,” says Kirk. “I would say up to the under-12s, 70 per cent is technical, just getting them to become familiar with the ball and execute actions. As soon as you get into ages 12 to 15, you want them to start thinking two, three, four phases ahead in the game.”

Dortmund is the biggest club in the Ruhr region, and its youth team play against local sides desperate to beat their illustrious opponents in yellow and black. Wearing Dortmund’s famous jersey at an early age gives boys a sense of the burden they will feel as professional players at the club. As Lars Ricken, a one-time Dortmund teenage star who now leads the club’s youth system, tells me: “The 80,000 spectators at Signal Iduna Park want to see goals. It’s a kind of spectacle and we have to create such players who are willing to create chances, who are full of courage.”

Englishman Tim Kirk, hired by Dortmund to coach their under-12s team © Jasper Bastian

Kirk takes me to a single-storey building on the far edge of Dortmund’s training ground. Inside lies the Footbonaut, a machine that has played a key part in the club’s methods. He smiles as he sends me into a robotic cage in the shape of a cube, and a floor laid with a pitch made of artificial turf. Each of the four walls is also made up of 16 square panels and, when the machine starts, balls fly at me from different angles and at different speeds, seemingly at random. Buzzers and flashing lights provide a split-second clue as to where a ball is coming from. My task is to trap the ball using my body, then strike it into one of the panels that lights up as a target. It is the footballing version of Whak-A-Mole. And far beyond my capabilities. At one point, I spin around to have a projectile fired into my thigh, almost knocking me over. Kirk is clearly amused.

The Footbonaut is hardly a secret weapon. Invented by the Berlin-based designer Christian Güttler, Dortmund installed it in 2011 at a reported cost of about $3.5m. But since then, only one other German club, Hoffenheim, have paid to build one. It may be no coincidence that, over the past decade, Hoffenheim are the only club in the Bundesliga to have regularly featured a younger starting 11 than Dortmund. Why, I ask, hasn’t every team installed this machine? “It’s expensive,” says Kirk. “I think clubs would rather invest money in things that give them an immediate return.”

I think they saw a lot of what I do now, my attacking mode, or just being a creative player and making a difference in the game
Christian Pulisic

The Footbonaut is not used by first-team players, already good enough to have mastered it. Instead, weekly sessions are provided for the younger players with the aim of giving each boy 5,000 extra “ball contacts” a year. Coaches tell me Christian Pulisic “lived” at the centre when he first arrived at Dortmund. But, they add, its greatest disciple was Mario Götze, who developed the ability to control balls fired at 100kph — double the velocity I faced.

The Footbonaut may even have won Germany the World Cup. As Raphael Honigstein explains in Das Reboot, his excellent book on German football’s quest for reinvention, the 2014 final between Germany and Argentina was goalless and heading towards the end of extra time, when, in the 113th minute, a high ball was delivered to Götze, on as a late substitute. In one sweeping movement, he chested the ball forward, then volleyed it into the corner of the net. It was a manoeuvre he had completed thousands of times before inside the Footbonaut.
[video]https://youtu.be/WhAyX81zP2M[/video]

“By the time they get to Götze’s level, everything they do is pretty much automatic, because they’ve just honed it, they’ve trained it,” Kirk explains. “It’s all about pictures. At a young age, you’ve just got to build and give them as many pictures about the game as possible so that they can choose the right one when the time comes.”

I ask him whether Dortmund’s young charges benefit from the “10,000-hour rule”, the popular idea that the key to achieving world-class ability is to spend that length of time practising a particular skill. “You’ve got to be careful with 10,000 hours,” Kirk warns. “Because it’s not just the 10,000 hours itself, it’s the content and it’s the manner in which the 10,000 hours are done. It’s about purposeful practice.”

The coach is referring to the work of Anders Ericsson, a Swedish psychologist dubbed the “world’s reigning expert in expertise” who argues that mindless, rote repetition should be carefully distinguished from focused, “purposeful practice”.


This requires certain conditions to be met, making students go beyond their “comfort zone” by constantly attempting skills just outside their current ability. It’s a kind of practice that allows true experts to create superior “mental representations” — that is, accurate pictures in their mind of how to perform their extraordinary tasks. An Olympic diver visualises the correct body positioning as they somersault through the air. 

A chess grandmaster sifts through a staggering array of future moves, before picking the best one. 

With their emphasis on youth and continuous development, Dortmund are a temple to such purposeful practice. To better understand the effect that years of dedicated training can have, I speak to Marco Reus, the Dortmund-born winger who is one of Germany’s most recognisable players. 

“When I do get the ball, it’s already too late to start thinking about what to do,” says the 28-year-old, when we meet in the bare Portakabin in which the club holds its press conferences. “I try to play in such a way that, when I get the ball, I already automatically know what will happen next.”

Marco Reus, Dortmund-born winger and German international © Jasper Bastian

To illustrate his point, he recalls a recent Champions League game against Real Madrid. With Dortmund 2-1 down, Reus’s teammate Emre Mor slides a long pass down the right side of the pitch, past Madrid’s centre back Sergio Ramos, into the path of striker Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang. “You know a situation may arise . . . and then,” Reus clicks his fingers, “one second earlier, or not even that, you need to start your move earlier than your opponent. I know Aubameyang is faster than Ramos, so I try to start off earlier than my defender to get ahead of him.”

Reus is sprinting towards goal, a yard ahead of Madrid’s chasing players. Aubameyang crosses the ball low. Reus slides just in time to meet the ball with his left foot, caressing it over the onrushing goalkeeper. He runs over to Aubameyang and the pair waggle index fingers at each other as if to say: “I knew you were going to do that.” Reus says his body simply reacted to a premonition that appeared a few seconds earlier: “And that’s how it played out.”

Borussia Dortmund fans and players celebrate winning the Bundesliga title, May 2011 © Getty

In March 2005, about 450 investors in Borussia Dortmund met in a building at Düsseldorf airport. A Dortmund executive told them the club would be declared bankrupt unless they signed up to a bailout plan. The proposal was accepted. Later it emerged that one outside group that helped save the club was their arch-rival Bayern Munich [Germany’s richest and most successful club], which had loaned €2m.

Academic research has shown that, in football, money does buy success. The best indicator of a club’s league position is a club’s wage bill. The problem was Dortmund didn’t have the cash to buy success. In trying to do so they had overextended themselves by paying huge salaries to star players.

Carsten Cramer, Dortmund’s chief operating officer, summarises the club’s financial crisis during this period succinctly. “We tried to overtake Bayern Munich, although we should know that it will be never possible to overtake a Bayern Munich.” Even today, when Dortmund rank as the 11th richest club in the world, with revenues of €283.9m in 2015-16 according to Deloitte, they remain far behind Europe’s true super clubs such as Bayern, which had annual revenues of €592m over the same year. 

Michael Zorc, Dortmund’s sporting director © Jasper Bastian

Dortmund’s solution to bridging this gap was to invest in cheaper, younger players. They sought to develop local kids through their academy system. Reus and Götze joined the club as boys, as did others who became Germany internationals, such as Kevin Grosskreutz and Marcel Schmelzer. The club also scoured the globe for youngsters such as Shinji Kagawa from Japan and the Gabonese striker Aubameyang, often thrusting them straight into the team. 

The plan paid off under legendary former coach Jürgen Klopp. When Dortmund won back-to-back Bundesliga titles in 2011 and 2012, the average age of his first title-winning team was 23.3 years, among the very lowest of the more than 100 clubs that have played across the “Big Five” European leagues of England, Germany, Spain, Italy and France over the past decade. Klopp had designed the perfect system for his youngsters — built on manic efforts to win back possession of the ball immediately after losing it, then streaming forward en masse to overwhelm the opposition. He later described it as “heavy-metal football”. 

Yet Dortmund’s success quickly attracted attention from Europe’s biggest spenders. As the players evolved into superstars, some came to expect superstar wages. Instead of paying more to keep them, Dortmund decided to sell to rivals who would. Götze went to Bayern Munich for €37m in 2013. Over the next few seasons, Bayern picked off two more key Dortmund players, Robert Lewandowski and Mats Hummels. In 2016, Götze’s replacement Henrikh Mkhitaryan was sold to Manchester United for €42m and United’s neighbours Manchester City bought Ilkay Gündogan for €27m.


Zorc insists this is not a business strategy and Dortmund would rather keep their best players. It is, rather, an acceptance of economic reality. “It’s because of money that is in the [English Premier League] and in these two clubs in Spain [Barcelona and Real Madrid]. By knowing this, we try to find these extraordinary players when they are not at their peak. We develop them and then, at some time, we know that they will go, like Gündogan to Manchester City; Sahin to Real Madrid; now Dembélé to Barcelona.”

The corollary is that Europe’s brightest prospects continue to be drawn to Dortmund. Last summer, Alexander Isak, a 17-year-old Swede, received an offer to join Real Madrid. Most would find it hard to turn down the chance to join a club that have won back-to-back Champions Leagues and feature superstars such as Cristiano Ronaldo and Gareth Bale. But when Dortmund made a last-minute counter offer, Isak did just that.

Alexander Isak, 18, who turned down a Real Madrid offer to sign for Dortmund © Jasper Bastian

He jokes that he chose Dortmund over Madrid because of “the simple beauty of the city”. But when I press him, he says: “I know the club and they achieved a lot with young talent and that makes people think that it is a good place. Real Madrid is probably also a great place for a challenge but Dortmund just felt right for me.” Isak made his first Bundesliga start last weekend.

For Cramer, the most important lesson of the club’s financial crisis in 2005 was “to focus on yourself, ask yourself what you stand for”. As a result, there is an acceptance that “we will be able, sometimes, to make it a little bit more difficult for [the likes of Bayern Munich and Manchester United], but it’s not part of our DNA to be obligated to be number one.”

If there is a concern, it is that Dortmund have become victims of their success, unable to keep hold of their best footballers for long enough to produce a winning team. Dembélé was there for just a year after the German club hired him as just another budding prospect for a fee of only €15m. In November, Sven Mislintat, the club’s chief scout who helped to discover many of their recent stars, joined Arsenal. 

Speculation now centres on the slight figure of Pulisic, who I meet in a cafeteria after a training session. He enters the room wearing a hooded blue jacket, appropriate for a freezing day in which drizzle threatens to solidify, and tackles my questions gamely but with caution.
[video]https://youtu.be/jOYod2pJ4mY[/video]

Pulisic says he doesn’t remember much about his performances in Turkey that impressed Dortmund’s scout, though “I think they saw a lot of what I do now, my attacking mode, or just being a creative player and making a difference in the game.” But he credits his subsequent emergence as one of the world’s best young players to Dortmund’s willingness to thrust him into the first team far earlier than most clubs would have contemplated. 

The player bats away the suggestion he is in line for a lucrative move elsewhere. “I’m not trying to impress another team,” he says. “I’m doing everything I can to help my team here.” Yet, few believe that if Pulisic continues on an upward trajectory he will stay beyond a few more seasons. 


Almost inevitably, it seems, a further stage is built into Dortmund’s process of continuous improvement; the chance to move to a megaclub like Barcelona and Real Madrid, where the standard of teammates — and the competition for places within the team — will be even higher. 

Unusually, the Dortmund way means it’s an outcome that could satisfy both player and club. “I learnt how to be a true professional and I was able to take a bigger step,” he says. “[Dortmund] always gave me opportunity. They allowed me to play, they gave me the training with the first team. They allowed me to develop, not too fast, but in the right way.” 

Murad Ahmed is the FT’s leisure correspondent
https://www.ft.com/content/da604a8c-fb1 ... 9be7f3120a

[unreal]

Premier League hopes to score new football rights bonanza
The multibillion pound auction for broadcasting English fixtures is due to kick off

For the first time, broadcasters can win the right to screen games on Saturday nights © AFP
Murad Ahmed, Leisure Correspondent FEBRUARY 2, 2018

The multibillion pound auction for UK broadcast rights to English Premier League football matches kicks off next week — a process in which Richard Scudamore has always emerged a winner.

Throughout his nearly two-decade tenure, the executive chairman of the Premier League has secured huge increases in what broadcasters are willing to part with for the right to show football matches on television in the UK. In 2015, when Sky and BT paid a combined £5.1bn for their three-year deal, it was a 70 per cent increase on the previous contract.

“The fact he keeps pulling off the same trick every three years is remarkable,” said David Kogan formerly the principal adviser to Mr Scudamore in six previous domestic rights auctions.

But this time, spurred by a drop in competitive tension between Sky and BT, the EPL chief has been active in seeking a third party to help drive up the value of the bidding once again.

According to several people familiar with the process, more than a dozen companies have received the Premier League’s tender documents, including tech companies Amazon and Facebook. Both have held meetings with Mr Scudamore, the people said.

Amazon and Facebook declined to comment. But the US groups are expanding into live sport. Amazon outbid Sky last year to win exclusive UK rights to ATP men’s tennis world tour matches, while Facebook has bid on events from US NFL games to Indian Premier League cricket.

Some people close to the discussions warn that the US tech groups’ interest does not necessarily mean bids will be forthcoming, while others close to the Premier League’s leadership downplayed expectations of another bumper price increase when the process starts next Friday.

After several years of pressure from UK and EU regulators to open up the process, the Premier League has invited broadcasters to bid for 200 of the 380 fixtures each season between 2019 and 2022 — up from 168 now. These 200 games will be split into seven packages and no single buyer will be allowed more than five of them.


Though Sky has always won the largest number of packages, Mr Scudamore has sought ways to make them more attractive. For the first time, broadcasters can win the right to screen games on Saturday nights, while on some midweek nights and bank holidays, they can show an entire schedule of matches — allowing viewers to pick the game they would like to watch.

Sky and BT will be serious contenders this time around. But BT, for its part, has said its ambitions for live sport have diminished and that it is satisfied with being a “strong number two” behind Sky.

A further incentive for the two to bid strongly against one another fell away in December, when they signed a cross-licensing deal. This means BT can include Sky Sports in its television packages for customers and Sky can sell BT Sport to its subscribers.

“The most important development, in the end, is the carriage deal agreed between Sky and BT,” said Mike Darcey, a former chief operating officer at Sky. “That will have spoiled Richard’s Christmas.”

This has left Mr Scudamore hoping an alternative serious bidder will enter to create a competitive auction.

“Richard got a godsend . . . when Amazon bought the ATP rights,” said Mr Darcey. “Suddenly, every journalist and stock market analyst thought maybe they’ll buy Premier League rights. It’s a pretty big reach from ATP tennis to taking on Sky for the Premier League but, if there’s any risk, it’s probably to BT.

“BT could have said: ‘We give up and want a saving’, and planned to pick up the two packages that Sky can’t win. Now BT has to worry that if they get too cute, then Amazon might grab the rights. I think it’s a pretty outside chance. It’s just enough to keep them honest.”

Mr Scudamore faced pressure for larger changes. According to people familiar with discussions, he was pushed by some Premier League clubs to review the way rights are sold. It was suggested he explore separating deals with TV broadcasters and creating a standalone online subscription service that sells games direct to fans.

This is a model employed successfully by US sports federations, including the National Basketball League and Major League Baseball.

According to a person familiar with the discussions, the Premier League hired Redshift, a London-based research agency, to investigate the idea. The conclusion was that the current “technology neutral” auction, where games are sold exclusively regardless of how they are screened, continues to be more valuable. Redshift and the Premier League declined to comment.

Ultimately, Mr Scudamore is sticking to a bidding process he knows better than anyone. But the final result remains impossible to predict. “Everyone assumes we had a clear idea of the outcome [in past auctions],” said Mr Kogan. “I can tell you, categorically, it’s always a surprise.”
https://www.ft.com/content/68751ee4-076 ... 0ad2d7c5b5

•Антилопа: Сколько тебе нужно золота?
Раджа: Э-э-э... много!
Антилопа: А если его будет слишком много?
Раджа (смеясь): Глупое животное! Золота не может быть слишком много!

•Раджа (по мере засыпания монетами): Сжалься!.. Пощади!.. Довольно!!! Помогите!.. Спасите!..

[Lirium]

Насчет молодежи... некоторые мысли. Хотя на слух ещё плохо английский воспринимаю, особенно если это не поставленный голос ведущего, а обычная речь с акцентами... некоторые детали упустила. Может это там говорилось, а может я сама додумалась =Р

Отбор молодежи на этап 16-18 лет и далее. Действительно много талантов может отброситься. Ведь игроков оставляют по принципу команды. И если в поколении много талантливых атакеров, и мало защитников, вот и получается, что многие интересные игроки уходят. Ну и наоборот тоже бывает. Счас в академии ситуация с интересными атакующими игроками, как в основе. Один Одои на всю команду, такого у нас давно не было, зато много посредственностей (хотя очень обидное определение), которых и в аренду нормальную не пристроить, и потенциала на данный момент они не показывают, а без них команда не набирается.

Хотя цель фильма - поверхностная социалочка, но и она хороша, о таких вещах тоже нельзя забывать.

* * *
Слова рук-ва Дортмунда в очередной раз доказывают, что если заниматься молодежью, то рассчитывать на первые места на постоянной основе не приходится. Под каждые возможности - своя ниша.

Еще интересна диаграмма с вливанием и успехом, собсно всё и так было понятно. Но для разнообразия оценить разницу Сандерленда и Арсенала в КПД (хотя тут не учитываются сопутствующие факторы, как привлекательность клуба, города, история побед, и уровень зарплат), и всё же любопытно.

И долго пыталась найти МС... Интересно, как выглядел бы Челс в период с 2003 по 2010 например =_=)) Но что-то мне кажется, всё равно было бы не так дико, как у МС.

Не понравилась совсем табличка с балансом по продаже молодых игроков. Помимо ограничения возраста покупки, надо ещё ограничение на возраст продажи указать. Например до 25 лет. Так-то Микел не может считаться потерей с точки зрения перепродажи молодого игрока.

В остальном как будто вывода статье не хватает. Но всё равно было очень интересно.
Огромное спасибо, unreal за отличный материал!

[Lirium]

It was suggested he explore separating deals with TV broadcasters and creating a standalone online subscription service that sells games direct to fans.

...The conclusion was that the current “technology neutral” auction, where games are sold exclusively regardless of how they are screened, continues to be more valuable.

Вот это интересно. Давно у меня такая идея: я бы даже платила за это, чтобы смотреть все матчи Челс без привязки к пакету каналов и так чтоб все турниры, а не так что кто-то не показывает КЛ/КА или вообще нет трансяций. И если бы ещё можно было выбирать интершум. Когда-нибудь к такому придём, но что-то очень медленно двигаемся

Кста, вот с этого сезона для фанатов Чемпионшипа, Лиги 1 и Лиги 2 запустили платформу iFollow. Платишь 110 фунтов за сезон и смотришь почти все матчи своей команды. Это доступно как раз для фанатов за границей. Минусы: это только матчи Лиги (вроде бы, т.к. не нашла опровержений и если честно не особо искала =Р), без кубков. И если матч в вашей стране транслируется партнером Лиги в вашей стране, то его тоже посмотреть нельзя через платформу, а только через канал партнера, такая вот фигня с правами. Но уже что-то. Для АПЛ как раз всё упирается в права трансляций, и если продавать непосредственно фанам, то ТВ-гиганты будут меньше платить за свою долю и ещё неясно, насколько выгодно будет по деньгам прямая подписка или на тв-пакеты каналов.